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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
Analogous cases appear in another field of equity. Despite the general
rule that equity will not specifically enforce contracts for the conduct of
operations requiring time, special knowledge, skill and personal oversight,
specific performance of such contracts has been granted where the public
welfare was involved. Pomeroy, Specific Performance of Contracts (3rd
ed. 1926) sec. 23; Joy v. St. Louis (1890) 138 U. S. 1; Union Pacific Ry. Co.
v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. (1896) 163 U. S. 564; Municipal
Gas Co. v. Lone Star Gas Co. (Tex. Civil App. 1924) 259 S. W. 684; Edison
Illuminating Co. v. Eastern Pennyslvania Power Co. (1916) 253 Pa. 457,
98 Atl 652. In these cases, as in the principal case, the interest of the
public helped to give to the complainant what ordinarily would not be
granted him. A. J. G., '36.
PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS-REASONABLE COIPENSATION-WEALTH OF
PATIENT.-Plaintiff-surgeon rendered valuable services to the minor daugh-
ter of the defendant at the defendant's request. Plaintiff made seventy-two
professional calls on the patient, gave her ten treatments, performed two
paracenteses, participated in five consultations and performed a very diffi-
cult and dangerous mastoid operation. Plaintiff then rendered a bill for
$2,400 which the defendant refused to pay and this suit was brought. At
trial plaintiff introduced testimony to show that the reasonable charge for
services should be based in part on the wealth of the patient and in a life
saving operation should be 10% of the net annual income. The defendant
objected to this testimony but the court refused to strike it out. Held,
reversible error, notwithstanding the fact that no evidence was introduced
as to the defendant's wealth or annual income. Scholz v. Mackay et ux.
(Mo. App. 1934) 75 S. W. (2) 605.
The decision of the court was placed squarely on the authority of
Morrell v. Lawrence (1907) 203 Mo. 363, 101 S. W. 571, where it was
emphatically said "He (physician) is entitled to a verdict for the reason-
able value of his services, although the defendant be a poor man. He
is not entitled to a verdict for more than the reasonable value of his
services, although the defendant may be a man of great wealth. The
jury in a case of this kind have no concern with the defendant's ability to
satisfy the judgment." This position was affirmed in the case of Glenn v.
Thompson (Mo. App. 1932-33) 45 S. W. (2d) 948, 61 S. W. (2d) 210.
Accord, Robinson v. Campbell (1878) 47 Iowa 625. The Missouri authori-
ties, however, make one, somewhat tenuous, distinction; in cases where the
defendant has introduced evidence that the plaintiff has charged other
patients smaller fees for similar services, the plaintiff in rebuttal may show
that these fees were made less than reasonable because of the patient's
poverty, and may then show defendant's ability to pay, solely for the pur-
pose of proving that he is not entitled to similar indulgence. The practical
wisdom of such an exception may be questioned.
The majority of the courts in other jurisdictions, however, hold that the
wealth of the patient and his ability to pay is a factor to be taken into
consideration by the jury in fixing a reasonable charge, most holding that
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the wealth and ability to pay directly affects the reasonableness of the
compensation. Schoenberg v. Rose (1914) 145 N. Y. Supp. 831; Pfeiffer V.
Dyer (1929) 295 Pa. 306, 145 Atl. 284; Bouziga's Succession (1925) 159
La. 853, 106 So. 328; Caulk v. Anderson (1931) 120 Tex. 253, 37 S. W. (2)
1008; Mount v. Riechers (1932) 140 Oregon 267, 13 Pac. (2) 335; Zumwalt
v. Schwartz (Cal. 1931) 297 Pac. 608; Houda -v. McDonald (1930) 159
Wash. 561, 294 Pac. 249. Other courts qualify the effect of the patient's
wealth as a factor by holding that it can be taken into consideration by
the jury only if it was a factor in the minds of the parties at the time
of the rendition of the services. Thus it has been said that the value
of the estate is inadmissible where there is no evidence of a recognized
usage so long established as to become a fixed custom to graduate pro-
fessional charges with reference to the financial condition of the person
for whom the services were rendered, so that it might be considered
that the services were rendered and accepted in contemplation of such
custom. Morrissett v. Wood (1899) 123 Ala. 384, 26 So. 307. It has
also been held that evidence of the patient's wealth was not admissible in
an emergency case where the patient was unconscious from accident at the
time of the rendition of the services, on the ground that the wealth of the
patient could not be within the contemplation of the parties when one of
them was unconscious. Cotnam v. Wisdom (1907) 83 Ark. 601, 104 S. W.
164. The majority view is perhaps the better where as a matter of com-
mon practice the members of the medical profession tend not to regulate
their charges by any fixed standard but rather to graduate them in accord-
ance with the financial condition of the patient. The social desirability of
such a practice may not be above doubt; nevertheless, in fixing the implied
terms of the contract, its existence cannot be overlooked.
J. D. Y., '36.
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